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I 
The Charity Commission, set up by an Act of the British Parliament 
in 1853 after seventeen years of special commissions and select committees 
on charities, 1 was a typical product of the age of reform. Its powers were 
limited and its objects were defined only by implication. Since it shared 
the lesser powers of the Court of Chancery over charitable trusts, respect 
for the division of powers demanded that its connection with Parliament 
should be slight: ten years earlier a bill to found a similar commission bad 
been withdrawn after accusations that it would give judicial powers to an 
executive body, 2 and an amendment to the 1853 bill, leaving the commis-
sioners eligible (like Poor Law Commissioners) to sit in Parliament, was 
heavily defeated. 3 Yet the new Commission required some access to the 
legislature: it could frame schemes to change the disposition of charitable 
funds, but they bad no force unless embcxlied in a parliamentary Act. At 
the same time it was supposed to be independent of politics, so that it was 
not put under a minister. It was new, but its powers were all old and all 
could still be exercised by their original owners - Chancery, Parliament or 
the attorney-general. It was expected to reform charitable trusts without 
changing the law concerning them and to make trustees efficient without 
compelling them to audit their accounts or to re-vest the property they 
administered. The demand for reform bad been met by pouring the old wines 
into a new bottle. The resulting ferment was laudable, but not very com-
fortable for the bottle. One of its results was that the Charity Commission 
was soon dissatisfied with its powers and with those of Chancery, to which 
trusts reluctant to be reformed could appeal. In that Court's jurisdiction 
over charitable trusts there was only one point where reform could hope to 
effect an opening. This was the cy-pres doctrine, by which the object of a 
trust could in certain circumstances be changed, provided that the new objeet 
was as near as possible to the old. Otherwise, Chancery operated to preserve 
the original objects of charitable trusts, no matter how irrelevant they might 
have become to the major national concern of urban poverty; and it also 
"' Department of History, Carleton University. 
1 See D. E. OWEN, English Philanthropy, 1-660-1960 (Cambridge, Mas&, 1964), 
183-208. 
2 Sir George Grey's bill of April 1843. Hansard, 3rd series, I.xix, 843-47. 
3 By 113 votes to 32 in the House of Commons. Ibid., cxxix, ,1487-90. 
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operated to preserve the trusts themselves, even when their funds were too 
small, when separately administered for diverse objects, to be regarded as 
reasonably efficient. 4 The Commission therefore sought both to acquire 
Chancery's cy-pres jurisdiction and to see it extended. That effort is the 
subject of this paper. 
The real weight of the Commission's function in 1853 was administra-
tive. To exercise its general powers of inquiry it had two inspectors, increased 
to five in 1856. To encourage the good management of charitable property 
its secretary was official trustee of charity lands, and he with the two original 
inspectors formed the official trustees of charitable funds . 5 Apart from 
these facilities the Commission was far better suited than Chancery to super-
vise the administration of charitable trusts. It was unhindered by other 
very different and heavy business, not precluded from taking the initiative 
in discovering abuses and not yet badly in need of reform itself. Above all, 
its services were cheap. The average cost of an application to Chancery was 
about £50; and a suit might take ten years, its cost absorbing the whole 
capital of the great majority of trusts then reported. 6 There were more 
subtle traps in Chancery, too. The Preston Hospital, in the course of an 
application in 1720, had its income held by officers appointed by the court. 
It was still so held in 1876, at an annual cost to the charity of about £100. 7 
lri c0ntrast, the Commission charged no fees. Its parliamentary schemes, to 
be presented as government bills, were also free to trusts, whereas private 
Acts cost a minimum of £600. 8 The facilities and knowledge made available 
to trustees were unprecedented; so was the legal immunity in effect conferred 
upon trustees who followed the Commission's advice. These benefits were 
.announced in the Gazette as well as in 15,000 circulars, with the result that 
the CommiSsion in its first full year of operation received over 1,100 
aipplications. 
It was however far from contented with its comparatively humble 
mission. ,In 1855 it suggested that "the direct remedial powers of our 
Board ... be judiciously, but considerably extended". 9 The next year it 
offered an argument: its orders and schemes were very rarely modified by 
judges, whether on the bench or in chambers. The power to authorize its 
own schemes, thus justified, would save work in the office. 10 And in Febru-
ary, 1860, immediately before being given a share of Chancery's power to 
4 Of 28,840 charitable trusts reported in 1850, 22,760 had incomes of less 
than £30 a year. Hansard, 3rd series, cxxvi, 1012. 
5 Return of Personnel, Salaries and Travelling Expenses made to the Civil 
service Commissioners, Parliamentary Papers, 1864 (83), xxxii. 
6 So two chancellors: Campbell in 1860, Hansard, 3rd series, clix, 1188; 
Cranworth .in 1853, ibid., cxxvi, 1012. 
7 Twenty-third Report of the Charity Commissioners, Parliamentary Papers, 
1876 (c. 1455), xx. 
s Hansard, 3rd series, cxxvi, 1015. 
1t second . Report of the Charity Commissioners, p. 3, Parliamentary Papers, 
1854-55 (107), xv. 
10 Third Report of the Charity Commissioners, p. 6, ibid., 1856 (2060), xxii. 
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change the objects of charitable trusts, the Commission asked for a great 
deal more: 11 
We believe also that a very important extension might be given to the 
general benefit resulting from charitable endowments by a judicious modifi-
cation of the present law, which generally prohibits any diversion of the 
funds from the specific objects prescribed by the Founder, so long as a strict 
compliance with his directions continues to be practicable; however remote 
the foundation may be, and however extensively the social condition of the 
locality intended to be benefited by it, or the proportion of the gift in point 
of value to the intended purposes, may have been changed. 
The Commission, in fact, launched its attack on the cy-pres doctrine before 
getting any power to apply it. 
Although the Commission already wanted more than the full cy-pres 
power, it was about to get less. The Charitable Trusts Act, 1860, attached 
conditions to the Commission's exercise of Chancery's jurisdiction over trusts. 
Of these, two were important. It could act only on the application of a 
majority of the trustees if the charity had £50 a year or more. For smaller 
charities the application of one trustee or any two inhabitants of the beneficial 
area would suffice; here the Commission was on equal terms with the 
courts. 12 Further, the Commission had to refer difficult or controversial 
cases to the courts. It could, in short, apply the cy-pres doctrine in simple 
cases if a body of trustees asked it to or if the trust were small enough . 
The Act had been intended to do more. As Lord Campbell first presented 
it, section five had given the Commission a choice of exercising its jurisdiction 
in contentious cases, but the choice was taken away in committee. Section 
four, requiring an application from trustees, had originally only given them 
a chance to object in writing. Even the less stringent rule for application 
to act on smaller endowed charities had been absent from section two as 
first drafted. Moreover there were other changes in committee and on 
re-committal, clearly showing Parliament's jealousy of the Commission: 
trustees could not be required to pay the cost of having themselves investi-
gated, the official trustees had to lay their accounts before Parliament annually 
and the Commission when exercising its new jurisdiction had to keep full 
minutes to facilitate appeal. It was not much consolation that the secretary's 
salary was raised in committee to £800. 13 
The truth was that even the Act of 1860, added to those of 1853 
and 1855, did not give the Commission the powers originally intended for 
it by Lord Cranworth. As actually created in 1853, it was a useful adminis-
trative body with incidental judicial powers. The Act of 1860 did not so 
far extend its judicial powers as to give it the general mission to reform 
charities that Cranworth intended. His original bill had proposed that the 
11 Seventh Report of the Charity Commissioners, p. 6, Parliamentary Papers, 
1860 (2652), xxxiv. 
12 Charitable Trusts Act, 1853, sec. 43; Charitable Trusts Act, 1860, sec. 4. 
13 The original bill and its two amended versions are in Parliamentary Papers, 
I 860 (242, 300, 3 31), iii. 
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Commission should have power to transfer any charitable funds to any 
charitable objects in four cases: where the original object of the trust had 
failed, where it had departed from the founder's intention or created pauper-
ism or immorality, where the union of small foundations would be useful 
and where a trust over sixty years old had no or insignificant beneficial 
results. The Commission was to frame schemes which were to be laid before 
Parliament, becoming law if not objected to within three months. If they 
were objected to, they might still pass as bills. 14 The Charity Commission 
envisaged in this measure would have had powers wider than the Court of 
Chancery - it would, in fact, have had delegated legislative authority - and 
the limitations of cy-pres would have been swept aside. Cranworth's plan 
amounted not simply to the creation of an independent board but to the 
reform of charity law and the supersession of Chancery's jurisdiction over 
charitable trusts. The City livery companies, the Society for the Propagation 
of the Gospel, the bishop of London and a variety of lawyers attached to 
their practice descended upon it. 15 The Act of 1853 as finally passed was 
practically a defeat. The Act of 1860 recovered only a very little ground, 
and left the Commission on a quite different basis from that originally 
proposed. It could accomplish major reforms of charitable trusts only by 
inducing Parliament to act or by acting itself within the limits of the 
cy-pres doctrine. 
The first of these alternatives was on the face of it much the more 
promising. The real source of the trouble lay not in the narrowness of the 
cy-pres power but in unrestricted testamentary disposition, combined with 
charities' exemption from the rule against perpetuities. The obvious instru-
ment of reform was legislative authority, applied either to refashion the 
general law of charities or to remedy abuses piecemeal. The Commission's 
authority to frame parliamentary schemes was intended by Cranworth to be 
the instrument of piecemeal reform; but the requirement that each scheme 
pass through Parliament as a bill frustrated the plan. The trouble was 
explained most directly by Robert Lowe: " .. . if anybody gets up and objects 
to the details, it becomes a mere question of statement and counter-statement 
between him and the person who has charge of the bill. Parliament naturally 
does not like to decide, and the thing falls through." 16 The Commission's 
first parliamentary scheme, for Sherburn Hospital, showed that even where 
abuse was clear remedies could meet opposition. 17 Some local interest or 
other was apt to oppose almost any change, and of course members of 
Parliament were not anxious to offend their constituents. Of the four 
Commissioners one was always a member, but he did not attend the board 
H Hansard, 3rd series, cxxvi, 1016-17. Cf. Arthur, Lord HOBHOUSE, The Dead 
Hand (London, 1880), 57. 
15 C. S. KENNY, The True Principles of Legislation with Regard to Property 
given for Charitable or other Public Uses (London, 1880), 152. 
16 Evidence before the Schools Inquiry Commission, Question 6547, Parlia-
mentary Papers, 1867-68 (13), xxviii. 
17 See the Commission's correspondence with the bishop and the archdeacon 
of Durham, ibid., 1856 (134, 1134-1), liv. 
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at all regularly until after 1887. In 1894 he did not even have a room in 
Gwydyr House. 18 In the absence of any member specifically charged with 
pleading the Commission's case, contested bills generally died for lack of 
defence. In sixteen years only eighteen succeeded 19 in spite of the fact that 
after the Magdalen Hospital scheme in 1857 the Commission deliberately 
avoided disputed cases. The House of Commons referred that scheme to 
Chancery, although Chancery had, on the attorney-general's recommendation, 
referred the similar case of another Newcastle hospital to Parliament. 20 
To reform 40,000 trusts one by one was not an attractive or a popular task 
for the national legislature. It presented the matter in the most esoteric, 
picayune, tiresome way possible. It made charitable trusts a perpetual 
nuisance, as Russell wrote in 1868, 21 always presented them so that public 
interest had no defence against private grievance and dragged the vital debate 
on principles on to exhaustion. Still, it was not very reasonable of Parliament, 
having refused to delegate its authority, also to refuse to exercise it. 
The Commission had expected great things of its parliamentary schemes. 
Their failure became the bitterest of its grievances. There seemed no way 
of pleasing Parliament. A scheme for the Etwall Hospital passed, but only 
after a clause extending the beneficial area had been dropped. The result 
was to leave £3 ,000 a year to 58 labourers. A scheme for Tancred's Charity 
was first changed in committee to follow the original bequest more closely, 
and then thrown out because of its narrow limitations. 22 "We indeed have 
authority to propose, but have no effectual power to promote [parliamentary 
schemes]", was an entirely justified complaint. 23 Even if a scheme lived to 
become an Act, there was no machinery for putting it into effect. 24 Reporting 
in 1868 that it had no schemes for Parliament, the Commission administered 
a rebuke to an erring legislature: 2 5 
[Parliamentary schemes have] not been unproductive to us at former 
periods of great discouragements. Schemes elaborated by us, after careful 
inquiry and consideration . .. have failed to be submitted to Parliament, in 
the face of vehement opposition of interested parties. We have possessed 
no means of ensuring to other proposals the effective support which they 
have appeared to ourselves to deserve, and without which they have failed, 
while other measures which we have felt it our duty to recommend have 
been discountenanced on their proposal to Parliament, under circumstances 
peculiarly embarrassing to us. 
1s T. E. Ellis before the Select Committee on the Charity Commission, Questions 
2743-49, ibid., 1894 (221), xi. 
19 So W. E . Forster in 1869, Hansard, 3rd series, cxciv, 1368-69. 
20 Sixth Report of the Charity Commissioners, pp. 4-5, Parliamentary Papers, 
1859, Session 1 (2948), xii. 
21 Russell to Hobhouse, 12 April 1868, L. T . HoBHOUSE and J. L. HAMMOND, 
Lord Hobhouse: A Memoir (London, 1905), 34. 
22 Hobhouse, op. cit. , 63-5, 65-8. 
23 Nineteenth Report of the Charity Commissioners, p. 6, Parliamentary Papers, 
1872 (c. 527), xviii. 
24 Sixteenth Report of the Charity Commissioners, p. 4, ibid., 1868-69 (4117), xvii. 
25 Fifteenth Report of the Charity Commissioners, p. 6, Parliamentary Papers, 
1867-68 (4017), xxi. 
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Having expressed its own disappointment, it proceeded in its next report to 
underline the public consequences: "The apparently powerful machinery 
devised by the legislature for effecting in this manner the reformation of 
Charities of special magnitude and importance is virtually powerless for its 
object." 26 Parliamentary schemes, in fact, did not work; and the Commis-
sion's ability to reform trusts therefore rested on its share of the cy-pres power. 
II 
Its report in 1868 drew this conclusion specifically, 27 and from then 
until 1873 every report except one attacked the limitations of cy-pres. All 
told, its complaints of the doctrine - not merely of its own limited powers 
to apply it - appeared in the tenth report, in the fourteenth through the 
eighteenth, in the twentieth and in the twenty-eighth. The tenth report (1863) 
admitted that the Commission's duty was confined "to the administration 
of the existing law'', 28 which it pointedly forbore to criticize at length. The 
sixteenth report (1869) offered a principle of reform, later repeated: all 
tribunals should be able to modify trusts "which by reason of the lapse of 
time or change of circumstances shall appear to be no longer beneficial to 
the object of the Charity ... ". 29 The twentieth report (1873) chose to 
emphasize that the real object of reform was to enable the wishes of founders 
to be properly carried out. What needed change were those provisions 
"no longer calculated to promote the substantial object of the foundation", 
the contim;ed protection of which would be "found upon a clear examination 
to be in reality subversive of the design of the · trust". 30 This solicitude for 
founders was not however indiscriminate; doles ought to be converted into 
useful charities. It is hard not to suspect that the Commission was trying 
to disarm criticism by this change in emphasis; in any case the dislike of 
cy-pres first expressed in 1860 was in no way modified. 
The next year the Endowed Schools Act transferred to the Commission 
powers wider than cy-pres for educational objects. Perhaps as a result there 
was a lull in its complaints. Then two shocks in 1880-81 drew from the 
Commission statements in its own defence. The first decision in the Campden 
Charities case by the Chancery Division (which by section 34 (3) of the 
Judicature Act, 1873, had inherited jurisdiction over trusts) appeared to 
restrict the existing scope of the cy-pres doctrine. The Charitable Trusts 
Bill, 1881, meant to increase several of the Commission's powers, foundered 
in the face of opposition. The first of these provoked the Commission into 
a statement of the importance of public interest in charities as the basis 
for their special privileges and for state control over them. The state ought 
26 Sixteenth Report of the Charity Commissioners, p. 4, ibid., 1868-69 ( 4117), xvii. 
21 Fifteenth Report of the Charity Commissioners, p. 7. 
28 Tenth Report of the Charity Commissioners, p. 4, Parliamelltary Papers, 
1863 (3130), xxviii. 
:rn Sixteenth Report of the Charity Commissioners, p. 8, ibid., 1868-69 (4117), xvii . 
:w Twentieth Report of the Charity Commissioners, p. 6, ibid., 1873 (c. 724), xxi . 
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to control trusts "co-ordinately with the intentions of the founder". 31 The 
cy-pres power of the courts did not provide that control, as all the legal 
witnesses before the Schools Inquiry Commission had agreed. In substance 
the Charity Commission made a restriction of the cy-pres doctrine the 
occasion for the most thorough-going of all its attacks upon the unreformed 
law of charities. Nor did the second shock cause it to recant. The debate 
on the Charitable Trusts Bill, 1881, led to a statement that appeared, after 
the failure of the bill, as an appendix to the report of 1882. 32 Thoroughly 
on the defensive, the Commission was nevertheless convinced of the justice 
of its own case. Its main concern was to show that it had usurped no 
powers, but only exercised those already belonging to Chancery before 1853, 
and that its jurisdiction was not directed against trustees. The argument 
for increased powers followed Cranworth's in 1853; it was based on the 
recommendations of the Brougham Commission, on a select committee's 
report in 1835 and on the bills that had preceded the first Charitable Trusts 
Act. The appeal was not to the authority of Parliament but to a plan of 
reform that Parliament had rejected. 
It must be said that in appealing to the proposals of 1835 to 1853 the 
Commission probably distorted them. The original recommendation for a 
body like the Commission, in July, 1835, seems to fit the Act of 1853 just 
as well as Cranworth's bill. 33 On the other hand, Cranworth claimed to 
derive his bill almost entirely from Lord Truro's of 1851. 34 But Lord 
Cottenham, who introduced bills in 184 7, 1848, 1849 and 1850, had 
preferred merely to facilitate Chancery's action; 35 successive Whig Chan-
cellors therefore disagreed. Still, in the debates of May 1853 Lord Brougham 
supported Cranworth. His claim to represent the accepted opinions of charity 
reformers was contested only by Lord St. Leonards, lately Conservative 
Chancellor, whose speech soon trailed off into a dispute with Brougham as 
to which of them had more faithfully attended the latter's Commission. 36 
But Cranworth himself was opposed to a fresh investigation of charitable 
trusts in 1864. x• The correctness of the Charity Commission's contention 
in 1882 may be left open, for it leaves the present point unchanged; in 
attacking the cy-pres doctrine the Commission was acting as an agent of the 
charity reform movement, not simply as a statutory body. 
During the years from 1860 to 1882, the period of the Commission's 
active discontent, charity reform had three clearly distinguishable forms. 
a1 Twenty-eighth Report of the Charity Commissioners, pp. 10-11, Parliamentary 
Papers, 1881 (c. 2862), xxviii. 
32 Twenty-ninth Report of the Charity Commissioners, Appendix A, ibid., 1882 
(c. 3198), xx. 
33 Report of the Select Committee on the Reports of the Commissioners of 
Charities, pp. vii-ix, Parliamentary Papers, 1835 (449), vii. 
:14 Hansard, 3rd series, cxxvi, 1011-13. 
:i~ Ibid., 3rd series, lxxxvi, 770. 
:l6 I bid., 3rd series, cxxvi, 1020-21. They had agreed to attend on alternate 
days, and each could therefore say that he had never seen the other on the Commission. 
37 HOBHOUSE and HAMMOND, op. cit., 34. 
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One was the movement for making charity organized and scientific. Bernard's 
call to "investigate practically and upon a system" was one of its texts, but 
before Booth began to work in the 'eighties most of them came from laissez-
faire economics. Beginning with a Benthamite insistence that charity must 
be judged by its results, the movement became more particularly distinguished 
by hostility first to doles and then to collective action . It was certainly the 
most important current in charity reform. The second was part of the 
movement for educational reform, which could neither avoid dealing with 
endowments nor resist the hope of diverting them as a painless way of paying 
for schools. The third, more directly Benthamite in origin than the first, 
was part of the movement for law reform which in these years transformed 
the procedure and structure of the courts of law. Its special preoccupation 
was the law of charitable trusts. The exemption from the rule against 
perpetuities which these trusts enjoyed, together with the lack of principles 
for defining them, had led to anomalies indefensible except at law; and all 
the currents of charity reform were decidedly hostile to them. It was however 
the law reformers who most explicitly stated, like the Charity Commission 
in 1881 and 1882, that public interest was the justification for the privileges 
of charitable trusts, and should be made the clear test by which they were 
defined and regulated. This, argued with varying degrees of moderation, 
was the burden of Fitch, of Mill in attacking him, of Hobhouse in attacking 
Mill and of Kenny without the stimulus of controversy. 
The Acts of 1853 and 1860 directed the Commission into the first of 
these currents of charity reform, where it might have been content to 
encourage the sound management of charity property. Schemes to vest 
property or to reform bodies of trustees needed no change of the law. But 
the question of legal reform was bound to arise. Scientific charity condemned 
doles, yet in 1877 dole trusts with £383,029 a year were the third largest 
category reported by the Commission. Apprenticeships, not much approved 
of, were more than twice as well endowed as Nonconformist chapels. 38 Even 
the consolidation of small charities required a parliamentary or a cy-pres 
scheme, and the Commission found both devices inadequate. Swimming 
with the current of educational reform, 39 it liked to convert dole charities 
into educational charities; and here, too, the law until 1874 thrust obstructions 
into the stream. With its personnel largely trained in equity law and with 
the law reformers in full swing, the Commission also naturally tended to 
recall the wider objects of Cranworth's original bill. It was a fair statement 
of the law to write, as Hobhouse did, that "the people regarded in dealing 
with foundations are not the living public but the dead founders". 40 Public 
benefit was not absolutely left out of consideration - "an almshouse for the 
kind treatment of scorpions" would not have been valid - but it carried 
38 Twenty-fourth Report of the Charity Commissioners, p. 4, Parliamentary 
Papers, 1877 (c. 1705), xxvi, which corrects the table given in the twenty-second report 
39 This was denied in 1884, but I think it was true earlier. Report of Select 
Committee on O:iaritable Trust Acts, p. vii, ibid., 1884 (306), ix. 
40 HOBHOUSE, op. cit., 51, 58. 
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little weight against the directions of founders. It was even explicitly ruled 
out from the bench: 41 "It is not ... the court's duty to direct charity property 
to be employed in such manner as it thinks will be the most beneficial for 
public purposes, hut to carry into effect the intentions expressed by the 
founder, so far as these are not contrary to any existing law." With the 
impetus of reform behind it, the Charity Commission could hardly be content 
to reform the administration of funds directed to unreformed objects. 
III 
The Commission's position was awkward. It wanted to reform abuses 
in charitable trusts, but could not go very far in doing so unless the supremacy 
of founders' wishes could be undermined. The charity law reformers could 
attack the sacred founder directly, claiming that bad law was sustained by 
ignorant reverence of an unworthy object. 42 They could propose the unre-
stricted alteration of trusts after 21 years, 43 or 21 years after life. 44 They 
could point out that trustees were in fact allowed to distort the intentions 
of founders with impunity, so as for example to make a bricklayer's founda-
tion for his own class into an aristocratic school. 45 Heroic courses were 
however ruled out for an independent board which had to fit its action to 
its powers. Since parliamentary schemes did not work, it could only attack 
the entrenched founder indirectly. But the cy-pres power, which in most 
cases was all - and more than all - that it had, had not been developed 
as an instrument of reform. It arose from one of the special privileges of 
charitable bequests by which they differed from others in not being void 
for uncertainty. This rule, already old, was confirmed beyond dispute by 
Lord Eldon in Moggeridge v. Thackwell (1802) and Mills v. Farmer (1815). 
Its corollary was another rule to help courts decide what a founder had 
meant or to save his charitable intention if his directions had been explicit 
but illegal. The cy-pres doctrine did not arise to save the public from 
bequests, but to save bequests from ambiguity. 46 Attempts to widen it for 
the use of reformers were therefore really attempts to reverse its original 
purpose. 
Of course, the paradox was by no means complete. Failure of mode 
and surplus of funds as well as the original "failure of gift" would justify 
the cy-pres application of a trust. It was on these first two grounds that 
cy-pres was usually invoked by the nineteenth century, and that it presented 
an opporturi ·ty for reform. In Da Costa v. De Pas Chancery had applied a 
41 Attorney-general v. Boucherett (1 855), quoted in L. S. BRISTOWE, C. A. HUNT 
and H. BURDETT, Th e Law of Charil~• and Mortmain. being the fourth edition of 
Tudor's Charitable Trusts (London, 1906), p. 145. Henceforth cited as Tudor on 
Charities. 
42 Special evidence that this was Hobhouse's policy is ha:rdly necessary, but see 
his letter to Carnarvon, 28 June 1871, HoBHOUSE and HAMMOND, op. cit., 39. 
4 3 Robert Lowe to Hobhouse, 7 April 1868, ibid., 34. 
44 Vice-Chancellor Wood (Lord Hatherley) to Hobhouse, 22 July 1868, 
HOBHOUSE and HAMMOND, op. cit., 32. 
4 5 KENNY, op. cit., 183-84. 
46 Tudor on Charities, 140, 97-8, 98-9. 
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bequest for instructing people in the Jewish religion to the Foundling Hospital. 
The case had been decided in 1753, but was (and is) about as far as any 
court had ever gone; the only discernible connection between the original 
and the cy-pres object would seem to have been that both were charitable. 47 
There were two important and really wide cy-pres applications in the twenty 
years before the Charitable Trusts Act of 1860. Thomas Betton's bequest 
was barely recognizable after 1844. One-half of the income, left to redeem 
British slaves from the Turks, was applied, not to the other two specified 
objects of the charity, but to Church of England schools anywhere in the 
country. This was a direct and deliberate contradiction of a rule stemming 
from the Thetford School Case of 1609. The court was, in Lord Langdale's 
words, "rather astute in entertaining some application in conformity more 
or less with the intention of the testator". And Lord Cottenham explained 
that "a charity might be cy-pres to the original object which seems to have 
no trace of resemblance to it, but which may be properly adopted if no other 
can be found having a nearer connection". 48 In 1859 Mrs. Ashton's will, 
although clear enough, was simply ignored except that her charity was left 
in Dunstable. 49 There was even a tendency to explain the cy-pres application 
of a bequest whose defined object had failed without reference to the rights 
of the founder. Property once given to charity, ran the explanation, was 
always given to charity, and cy-pres was meant to enforce the rule. This 
however was neither accurate history nor accepted law. 5° Chancery did not 
regularly show the astuteness Langdale claimed for it; rather it kept its eye 
firmly on the terms of bequests. "What the Court looks for in all Charities", 
said Romilly as Master of the Rolls, "is the original intention of the 
founder. . . If it cannot carry them into effect specifically, it carries them 
into effect as nearly as may be, and with as close a resemblance to them 
as it can." 51 Where a bequest had clearly meant to found almshouses, it 
could not be applied to give hospital treatment to the almoners. 52 The two 
really wide cy-pres applications in 1844 and 1859 were most unusual cases. 
In both the surplus was spectacular: £3,500 a year to redeem no slaves in 
Betton's Charity, £6,000 a year to six almswomen in Ashton's. They did 
not in themselves bring about a real change in the doctrine of cy-pres. It was 
still designed to preserve the will of the founder, not to apply to it the test 
of public benefit. 
After 1860 however the courts began increasingly to change founders' 
intentions without admitting it. The lead here came from the judgment in 
41 AMBLER, 228. 
•s Attorney-general v. The Ironmongers' Company (1844), Tudor on Charities, 
205-8. 
49 In re Ashton's Charity (1859), Beavan, 117. 
l>O Attorney-general v. Lawes (1849), A. D. TYSSEN, The Law of Charitable 
Trusts (2nd ed., London, 1821), 184-92. This explanation was apparently in the original 
edition of Tudor on Charities, but I did not find it in the fourth edition. Besides the 
cases cited in Tyssen, the authority of Holmes is against it. Stratton v. Physio-Medical 
College (1889), 149 Mass. 505. 
51 Attorney-general v. The Dedham School (1857), TYssEN, op. cit., 181. 
52 Philpott v. St. George's Hospital (1854), 27 Beavan 107. 
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the Ashton case, which specifically said that Mrs. Ashton could never have 
intended to give so much money to so few almswomen. The will itself 
contained a hint for this view, because in it Mrs. Ashton had clearly been 
in doubt that there would be any surplus at all after paying six pounds a 
year to each of six almswomen. The surplus was therefore applied to a 
Church of England school, open to dissenters. Clephane v. The Lord Provost 
of Edinburgh (1864) 53 and In re Latimer's Charity (1869) 54 were cases 
where no similar hint was to be found, yet the bequests were applied cy-pres. 
Change of time and circumstance might make it undesirable to adhere 
strictly to the original object; it was not necessary to wait until adherence 
had become impossible. Although Lord Westbury's explanation that "the 
means for the attainment of the end may be altered from time to time" 
became the most quoted part of his judgment, it did not really touch the 
heart of the matter. That was done by Sir George Jessel, Master of the 
Rolls, on 24 May 1881 in the Campden Charities Case. The cy-pres juris-
diction, he said, "[arises] wherever it is no longer possible beneficially to 
apply the property kft by the founder or donor in the exact way he has 
directed it to be applied, but it can only be applied beneficially to similar 
purposes by different means". 55 It was not enough to ensure its inviolability 
that the founder's object be defined and practicable, it had to be beneficial 
as well. The test of public benefit had crept in. 
Jessel's judgment was doubly important. In the first place it stated 
the widening tendency with a clarity attained only once before, and that 
outside Chancery. The Irish Board of Requests in 1800 had been empowered 
by statute to make cy-pres applications of charitable bequests when their 
objects were only "inexpedient". This power, wider than Chancery possessed, 
was removed altogether when Sir James Graham reconstituted the Board 
in 1844. The main objections had however arisen from the fact that its 
members were all protestants, so that the point of law was not discussed. 
When in 1864 the Board recovered its cy-pres powers, they were defined to 
be the same as those exercised by Chancery. 56 Jessel's judgment was more 
successful. He was the ablest equity judge of his day, and certainly the least 
guilty of judicial timidity. "I may be wrong", he once said, "but I never 
have any doubts." 57 His authority owed something to the force of his 
character as well as of his arguments; and on his death in 1883 no comparable 
champion of reform appeared. Nevertheless his decision became a leading 
53 L. R., 1 H. L., Sc. App. 417. 
54 L. R., 1 Eq. 353. 
55 Jessel's Judgment is quoted in Tudor on Charities, 214-16. The whole case, 
with the concurring judgments of James, 1. j., and Lush, 1. j., is in L. R., 18 Ch. D., 
322-24. James' judgment received little notice, but was in a way more remarkable 
than Jessel's. He said that no scheme could be more cy-pres than another; it was 
eitheT cy-pres to the original object or not. Any scheme which qualified has as good 
claim at law to be adopted as the one most nearly resembling the original object in 
fact. This amounts to translating cy-pres not as "as near as possible" but as "near 
enough". 
56 KENNY, op. cit., 200. 
57 James, Lord BRYCE, Studies in Contemporary Biography (London, 1903). 
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case. Although courts did not continue the widening process 58 his statement 
was not directly questioned until In re Weir Hospital in 1910. Then Cozens-
Hardy, Master of the Rolls, added the rider that the case for a cy-pres 
application "cannot be manufactured, but must arise ex necessitate rei". 59 
He admitted however that of various permissible cy-pres objects the court 
was competent to choose the most beneficial. 
Moreover Jessel quashed a rebellion against the widening tendency, 
Vice-Chancellor Hall's original decision in the Campden Charities Case. 
The endowment was a complex one: there were three bequests, the beneficial 
area had already been turned into six parishes instead of one, and the 
Charity Commission's scheme proposed not only to consolidate the bequests 
but to define eight cy-pres objects. Half of these, with half the income 
(which had grown from £10 a year to £3,600), were educational. It was 
on this point that Hall stuck. Part of Lord Campden's bequest might in his 
opinion go to education, as contributing to its object, "the good and benefit 
of the poor of the town of Kensington". But Lady Campden's bequest had 
been one-half "for the benefit of the most poor" in the area and one-half to 
apprentice "one poor boy or more". Apprenticeship was only part of one 
of the educational objects in the new scheme, and Hall refused to sanction 
so wide a departure from the will. Apprenticeship might be old-fashioned, 
but he required to show that it was actually injurious or illegal. Since it 
was neither, it must continue to enjoy half the income of Lady Campden's 
property, because she had set that ratio in 1634. 00 Of course, Hall's 
precedents were good, especially In re Lambeth Charities. But Jessel's were 
equally so, and reflected a more recent tendency. 
The success of J essel's decision however depended less on the weight 
of his precedents than on the fact that a breath of charity reform had reached 
the judges. It was only a breath. Its influence did not extend to the 
substitution of public benefit for the founder's authority as the essence of 
the cy-pres doctrine. Public benefit was simply imported as a compliment 
to the good sense of the founder. He was to be presumed to have intended 
it and the courts could restore it if changes had removed it from his bequest. 
Jessel was the last Master of the Rolls to be actively interested in the reform 
of charity law. Westbury, who had left office under a cloud in 1865, was 
almost the last Chancellor. Cranworth in succeeding him returned to the 
Woolsack for only eleven months, and was within two years of his death. 
Hatherley and Selborne were occupied with the re-organization of the courts 
rather than the reform of the law itself. Both Selborne and Cairns, who 
between them held the Great Seal from 1872 to 1885, defended the founder's 
58 ln re Buck (1 895), 65 L. J ., Ch. 881 , seems to have been the most important 
case between 1881 and 1910. The decision upheld a cy-pres applicatio'l of surplus 
funds, but laid down rather narrow rules for the definition of a surplus. The precedent 
here was the decision by Jessel's predecessor in Attorney-ge11eral v. Love. V. Tudor 
on Clw•ities, 146. 
59 L. R., 2 Ch. 132, 124. 
60 L. R., 18 Ch. D ., 310-22. 
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authority as the formal basis of the law of charitable trusts. 61 On the whole 
it is remarkable how quickly the cause of charity law reform ceased to 
influence the bench. 
While this was a bar to the redefinition of charitable trusts, it did not 
prevent courts from considering public interest in cy-pres applications. 
Their view of it was not particularly wide, any more than their consider-
ation of it was made an active principle. The practice probably owed 
far less to the law reformers than to the promoters of scientific charity. 
Well before In re Campden Charities that movement had become strident 
in its condemnation of doles; in this it was joined by archbishops as well as 
by royal commissions, and judges seem not to have been immune. For in 
only one particular was the courts' consideration of public interest in cy-pres 
applications thoroughly clear: it was the ground on which they preferred 
education to doles. Fifteen years before the Campden Charities Case Vice-
Chancellor Kindersley had been unequivocal: 62 "I think, by common con-
sent, it is established at the present day that there is nothing more detrimental 
to a parish, and particularly to the poor inhabitants of it, than the having 
stated sums periodically payable to the poor of that parish by way of charity, 
and when the funds increased therefore would not augment the part to be 
applied for the benefit of the poor." Twenty years later the solicitor-general 
thought the courts had a confirmed tendency to prefer educational to 
eleemosynary charities. 6 3 The tendency had been long in growing. When 
Lord Macnaghten in 1891 put education in a class by itself as a charitable 
object, he was not being original. His famous classification in Commissioners 
of Income Tax v. Pemsel derived from one by Sir Samuel Romilly as counsel; 
and Romilly had been dead for seventy-three years. 64 The second Campden 
decision did not begin the tendency, it only avowed its impact on the cy-pres 
doctrine. 
This second decision was balm to the Charity Commission, as the first 
had been a blow. As the principal maker of cy-pres applications, the 
Commission was of course pleased to see their scope widened. There was 
also a second success in the judgment. In an earlier case Jessel had addressed 
himself to section five of the Charitable Trusts Act, 1860, which had been 
amended in committee so as to forbid the Commission to exercise its cy-pres 
jurisdiction in cases it thought contentious. His predecessor, Romilly, had 
supposed that the section meant what it said. 65 Jessel, giving his judgment 
on In re Burnham National Schools (1873), had discounted Romilly's state-
ment as obiter dictum and had interpreted the section to mean "that the 
Charity Commissioners should not be compelled to take upon themselves 
the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by the Act in any case in which 
61 HoBHOUSE, op. cit., 83. 
62 Attorney-general v. Marchant (1866), TYssEN, op. cit., 61. 
63 Sir Horace Davey's evidence before the Select Committee on the Endowed 
Schools Acts, Question 51126, Parliamentary Papers, 1886, Session l (191), ix. 
64 William, Lord BEVERIDGE, Voluntary Action (London. 1948). 194, note I. 
65 In re Hackney Charities, Tudor on Charities, 245. 
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they considered that it could be so much better dealt with by a judicial 
court that it would be improper for them to exercise that jurisdiction". If 
the Commission wanted to act "this section, it appears to me, did not interfere 
with it at all". He therefore dismissed a petition against a scheme, finding 
"no such gross miscarriage, no such utter want of discretion as ought to 
induce a Court of Appeal to interfere in the matter". 66 The Commission's 
counsel in the Campden Charities Case naturally urged this kind decision 
upon Hall, who would admit no more than that the Commission's schemes 
must be examined with due regard for its great experience and qualifications. 
On the appeal Jessel took the opportunity to confirm his own earlier decision. 
Although he did not repeat his flight of fancy about section five, he did rule 
that the Commission's schemes could not be defeated on matters of detail. 
If no rule of law had been broken and no gross miscarriage of justice had 
taken place the court could not inquire further. Lord Justice James, in his 
concurring opinion, thought that the Commission's jurisdiction was the main 
question in the case. It was certainly the main beneficiary . The Commission 
had not been freed of section five, but until the Weir Hospital Case its 
schemes had a special position before the courts. 
After 1882 the Commission's reports no longer complained of the 
cy-pres doctrine. The Second Commissioner even expressed his satisfaction 
with it. 67 Yet the rather hesitant development apparently consolidated by 
J essel's decision did not go very far. Its results did not approach the unre-
stricted revision of trusts after forty or a hundred years that Mill had conceded 
to be necessary in 1869 - and Mill thought he was defending founders . 68 
The Commission's own argument in its report of 1881 would seem to require 
that the cy-pres doctrine be expanded into a legal fiction, under cover of 
which the state could revise trusts whenever the public benefit indicated. 
Jessel had tried hard, but he had done nothing like that. It is probably true 
that the Commission, especially alarmed by the first Campden decision, had 
stated a stronger case than it was prepared to stick to; but even so it is 
hard to believe that it was silent only because the assault on the doctrine 
had been successful. In 1890 it could still have doubts of its cy-pres jurisdic-
tion, based on a Chancery decis ion in 1854. The trustees of a Wesleyan 
trust dating from l 7 51, the terms of which were no longer compatible with 
the Methodist system, applied for a scheme. The case was not contentious 
and the changes would leave the founder's object intact; but Chancery had 
rejected a similar application in Attorney-general v. Clapham. The Commis-
sion therefore resorted to a parliamentary scheme. 69 After all, it had asked 
for a statute and been given only a decision. 
66 Tudor on Charities, 245, 251. 
67 Sir Henry Longley's evidence before the Select Committee on the Charitable 
Trusts Acts. Questions 1258-67, Parliamentary Papers. 1884 (306), ix. 
68 "Endowments'', in Fortnightly Review, April, 1869, 377. 
69 Thirty-seventh Report of the Charity Commissioners. para. 18. Parliamen tary 
Papers, 1890 (c. 5986). xxvi. 
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IV 
The Commission was not without real successes, but they had been 
gained on quite other grounds. The cheapness and simplicity of · its procedure 
had begun to tell against the courts immediately after the Charitable Trusts 
Act of 1860. In the first ten years of that Act's operation Chancery had 
received 90 charity applications and the county courts eight. Meanwhile 
the Commission had made 3,056 orders under the Act. The last application 
to a county court had been made in 1874. After Jessel's decision there were 
to be only nine applications to Chancery during the rest of the century. 70 
Now the great majority of these applications and orders were not for cy-pres 
schemes but for the vesting of property and the appointment or removal of 
trustees. As the Commission's business grew, it appeared that the powers 
with which it was dissatisfied nevertheless gave it plenty to do. In 1884, 
making out a case for more staff and space, the Commission made an 
instructive review of the increase in its business. By far the largest increase 
- 167.8% -was in the stock held by the official trustees. The number 
of their separate accounts had increased by 117 .5 % . The increase in number 
of schemes was only 35 % . There were also powers· wider than cy-pres 
under the Endowed Schools Acts and the London Parochial Charities Act; 
but these did not last. Not counting the Charitable Trusts Acts, the Com-
mission had been given powers beneath rather than beyond cy-pres by nine 
other statutes. Here was a gradual development far outweighing even the 
special consideration accorded by Jessel to the Commission's schemes. After 
1881 there was to be no successful appeal against them until 1910; but then 
there had been only two before. 71 
The early eighteen-eighties did see the real crisis in the Charity Com-
mission's development, but the Campden Charities Case was not the main 
element in it or even in the settling of the Commission's cy-pres jurisdiction. 
That jurisdiction was still limited over trusts with an annual income of £50 
by the necessity of an application from a majority of the. trustees, and over 
all trusts by a right of appeal which the Commission did not control. Nine-
tenths of all trusts were outside the first condition, which nevertheless inter-
fered with the amalgamation of local charities. 72 The second condition 
meant that the Commission could not make a scheme likely to be appealed 
against because the appeal might ruin the trust. 73 In 1881 and .1883 bil1s 
were introduced in Parliament to extend the Commissioners' powers in these 
and in other respects. Not only did the bills fail, they occasioned an attack 
on the Commission. It emerged from the scrutiny of two select committees 
with reasonable credit but with a chastised spirit. 
TO Tudor on Charities, 24. 
71 Thirty-first Report of the Charity Commissioners, p. 9, Parliam entary Papers, 
1884 (c. 3936), xxll ; Twenty-eighth Report of the Charity Commissioners, ibid., 1881 
(c. 2862), xxviii. 
12 Report of the Select Committee on the Charitable Trusts Acts, p. x, ibid., 
I 884 (306), ix. 
73 Sixteenth Report of the Charity Commissioners, ibid., 1868-69 (4117), xvii . 
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On the same day- 24 May 1881 - that Jessel delivered his judgment, 
the House of Lords emasculated the Charitable Trusts (Amendment) Bill in 
committee. In July Gladstone gave up hope of its passage and withdrew it. 
Re-introduced in the session of 1883, it was again withdrawn in July. The 
Commission wanted a third try in 1884; but by then it was more anxious 
for a full inquiry to dispel" ... the misapprehensions which have been widely, 
and, as we cannot but think, mischievously entertained as to the law by 
which Charities are regulated and as to the practice which has been adopted 
by the Courts of Equity and by our Board in giving effect to its provisions". 74 
The Commission, which had once sung its own advantages, was now reduced 
to pleading its own regularity. And behind the suspicion of irregular behav-
iour lay dislike of its whole position. The first Charitable Trusts Bill in 
l 843 had been opposed for giving judicial powers to the executive, and 
had failed. 75 When the Commission was created, the main objection to 
having its members eligible to sit in Parliament had been that its work 
was to be partly judicial. 76 The not very profitable debate on the nature 
of its powers was still going on in 1894. Besides, the ineffectiveness of the 
parliamentary Commissioner left his colleagues in an increasingly uncomfort-
able position. An active independent board was naturally suspect in a 
Parliament becoming aware that an administration could escape from political 
control. The Poor Law Commission, the prototype in 1853, was in 1871 
put under the new Local Government Board with a minister to answer for it. 
The Charity Commission however moved the other way. Its parliamentary 
member had usually held office - the not very exalted one of vice-president 
of the committee of the Privy Council on education. The Commission's 
schemes under the Endowed Schools Act of 1874 put him in an anomalous 
position: he was responsible for drafting them in one office and reviewing 
them in another. He therefore ceased to attend. The Commission was thus 
without a spokesman in 1881 and 1883, and could plead its case only by 
being investigated. When the parliamentary Commissioner in 1887 first began 
to attend with any regularity, he was without office. He answered questions 
in the House of Commons but was not responsible to it as the head of a 
department. 77 The Commission therefore had to face both Parliament and 
the Treasury without the support of the party in power. 
At the same time, the tide of charity reform had ceased to run altogether 
in its favour. The protagonists of scientific charity, and especially the Charity 
organization Society, had in the decade of the seventies made their condem-
74 Thirty-first Report of the Charity Commissioners, p. 2, Parliamentary Papers, 
1884 (c. 3936), xxii. 
75 Hansard, 3rd series, !xix, 843-47. 
76 Ibid., 3rd series, cxxix, 1478-90. 
77 The parliamentary Commissioner was content with his position, but the 
Chief Commissioner was not. J. W. Lowther's evidence before the Select Committee 
on the Charity Commission, Questions 2320, 2325-26; Sir Henry Longley's evidence 
before the Select Committee on the Charity Commission, Questions 2320, 2325-26; 
Sir Henry Langley's evidence before the same committee, Questions 142-70, 174-84, 
Parliamentary Papers, 1894 (221), xi. 
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nation of doles a part of the current attack upon outdoor relief. Distinguished 
as the founders of the Society were for moral fervour and intellectual integrity, 
their results were unfortunate. The Society itself became a sort of laisser-faire 
sect, ultimately repudiated by most people interested in charities and by 
some of its own members. It succeeded however in discrediting personal 
almsgiving and in replacing it by a doctrine "repellent in its apparent 
hardness". 78 Although the doctrine carried conviction it brought little 
comfort. "How one longs", ran a complaint in 1879, "for some outpouring 
of comfortable, unhesitating, old-fashioned, joyous bounty - not judicious 
administration of charity, but a good hearty swing of generosity - if only 
it might be innocently indulged in." 79 Even active members of the Society 
did not always remember that the poor starved because of the alms they 
received. At one of its early committees a member gave an old woman 
sixpence while the chairman was in the act of explaining why she was not 
a "helpable" case. Afterwards he shed tears of remorse, but then he was 
unusually well instructed. The very man who reprimanded him later left 
the Society because it substituted "a relief-giving machine for a helping 
hand". 80 Scientific charity became a cause with which few politicians cared 
to associate themselves. Parliament and enlightened charity were divorced. 
Opposition to the Charity Commission now drew not merely upon conserva-
tive but upon humanitarian feeling. When Joseph Warner Henley, who had 
contested the Charitable Trusts Acts of 1853 and 1860, was rendered 
harmless by deafness more aggressive members were ready to replace him. 
Of these the Birmingham politician Jesse Collings was the most formi-
dable, or at least the most dedicated. His hostility seems to have been first 
aroused over the Allotments Extension Act, 1882, a measure by which 
the lands of dole charities were to be let as labourers' allotments, and to 
which he was devoted. He accused the Commission of helping trustees to 
evade the Act. The truth was that the Act was unenforceable 81 although the 
Commission had been a little lacking in zeal for it. Then came a conflict 
with the corporation of Birmingham over a charity scheme 82 an attempt 
by Collings to cut the Commission's estimates and finally, in 1894, his 
full-scale attack before the Select Committee on the Charity Commissioners. 83 
Their object, he charged, was "the spoilation of the poor". Only the 
Education Act of 1870 had restrained them from an attempt to destroy all 
free (i.e. gratuitous) education, and they were still engaged in robbing the 
poor to educate the middle and upper classes. Henley had been suspicious, 
78 Beatrice WEBB, M y Apprenticeship (London, 1926), 195. 
79 Caroline Emilia STEPHEN. "Receiving Strangers", printed in M. GooDWIN 
(ed.), Nineteenth Century Opinion (Harmondsworth, 1951), 71. 
80 Mrs. S. BARNETT, Canon Bomett, his Life, Work and Friends, 2 vols. (London, 
1918), i, 29; ii, 263-64. 
81 Second Report of the Select Committee on the Charitable Trusts Acts, p. viii, 
Parliamentary Papers, 1884-85 (33), viii. 
82 Longley's evidence before the Select Committee on the Charitable Trusts 
Acts, Questions 1332-41, ibid. , 1884 (306), ix. 
83 Questions 3697, 3704-9, ibid., 1894 (221), xi. 
HISTOIRE .SOCIALE - SOCIAL HISTORY 
but never savage. Scientific charity was reaping the whirl-wind. Not until it 
merged into a new movement for social security did it become a political asset. 
Meanwhile the Charity Commission was the object of distrust from 
another point of view. Its incursions into local affairs can never have been 
popular, and it had grown used to a good deal of passive resistance. The 
Burston-le-Willows Charity quietly ignored its demands for years. 84 The 
Griffith Amerideth Charity, Exeter, was aggrieved to have the dividends 
on its funds withheld by the official trustees. Founded in 1556 to buy shrouds 
for prisoners executed in Exeter, it had responded to the shortage of prisoners 
by using its income to buy petticoats for old women, without the formality 
of a cy-pres scheme. 85 Local initiative, the trustees no doubt felt, was best. 
Affected by the course of municipal reform, many charity reformers were 
coming to agree. "We must", wrote Kenny, "rely on metropolitan authority 
for supervision, but we must beware of trusting to it for motive power." 
To this characteristically judicious statement Hobhouse gave characteristically 
decided support. 86 Local initiative, thus reinforced, showed itself formidable 
against the Charitable Trusts (Amendment) Bill of 1881. The Royal Society 
of London for Improving Knowledge got itself exempted from the Charitable 
Trusts Acts. The Corporation of London procured petitions against the bill. 
Lord Cairns, making the main speech against it in committee, denounced it 
as "something in the nature of a rebuff to all charity trustees throughout the 
Kingdom". Salisbury saw in it "a gigantic scheme of centralization". 87 
Even the Select Committee on the Charitable Trusts Acts did not support 
the Commission against municipal authorities. Notwithstanding the Second 
Commissioners argument against having them prepare schemes, the Com-
mittee recommended it. Local wishes were even set up as the substitute 
for private interest in charity administration. 88 
Both these turns of opinion were made formidable by their connection 
with the .new r~dicalism, which brought Joseph Chamberlain into the Cabinet 
in 1880. Its incipient class-consciousness, useful at the polls after the Reform 
Acts of 1884 and 1885, was strong enough to encourage resentment against 
charity accompanied by Olympian pretensions. "Gas-and-water" socialism 
contained the' seeds of a collectivism to which the classical tradition of charity 
reform was as yet unattuned. Above all, municipal freedom had been its 
origin and was still its shibboleth. To make matters worse for the Commis-
sion, simple enduring conservatism, which had worn out the movement for 
charity law reform, reinforced the new source of hostility. Charity accom-
panied by scientific ·cant offended it more as the cant grew louder in the 
'seventies . . It had always preferred a dead to an interfering hand. Ensconced 
in Parliament, in the Church, and in thousands of boards of trustees, it 
84 Hansard, 3rd series, cclxiv, 1913. 
85 Ibid., 3rd series, cclxxx, 545-46. 
86 KENNY, op. cit., 154. HoBHOUSE, op. cit. 
87 Hansard, 3rd series, cclxii , 834; cclxiii, 1134; cclxi, 1183-90, 1190-92. 
88 Report of the Select Committee on the Charitable Trusts Acts, Questions 
1237-38, and p. xi, Parliamentary Papers, 1884 (306), ix. 
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resisted central control over charities with a perseverance that the Commission 
could not match. When the problems of Ireland and empire brought 
Chamberlain into Salisbury's third Cabinet nine years after leaving Glad-
stone's, what was left of his following accepted the Conservative label. 
The ground had been prepared by the social legislation of Salisbury's second 
ministry; especially the Local Government Act of 1888 which created 
County Councils, the Technical Instruction Act of 1889 which made them 
the authorities for that subject and the abolition in 1891 of fees in elementary 
schools. Paternalism, if sufficiently discreet, could find points of resemblance 
to collectivism, if sufficiently local. It was to a foreshadowing of this political 
re-alignment that the Charity Commission's last hope of wider powers 
fell victim. 
In 1887 the Treasury entered the field against it. 89 Finally, it lost 
control of the only permanent breach in the cy-pres doctrine, the power 
under the Endowed Schools Act to divert funds to educational objects without 
reference to the will of the founder. The Commission had been given that 
power in 1874; it lost it on 7 August 1900, by an order-in-council under 
the Board of Education Act of 1899. Well before this the Commission had 
lost not only the chance but the will to enlarge its mission. In the tactful 
words of the select committee of 1894, it showed "in recent years especially, 
a juster sense of the requirements of public opinion". 00 Cranworth's bill 
of 1853 was not even a memory. The limited usefulness of the parliamentary 
Commissioner was of concern less because he did not ensure the success 
of parliamentary schemes than because he did not effectively defend the 
Commission in the House of Commons. Ignoring Jessel's invitation, the 
Chief Commissioner disavowed any desire to settle controversial schemes. 
The Commission's reports became increasingly formal and dull: solid accounts 
of useful work, but without the old overtones of self-congratulation, mission-
ary zeal or indignant self-defence. 
The attack on the cy-pres doctrine had indeed been the beginning of 
this process. It had represented a lesser objective than the plan of reform 
by parliamentary schemes, a narrower range of power than Cranworth had 
proposed, a particular rather than a general assault on the law. The attack 
cannot be called a failure, although there is no evidence that it was the 
direct cause of the judicial widening of the cy-pres power. The most striking 
thing about cy-pres applications to the courts after 1881 is not the leniency 
with which they were regarded but the infrequency with which they were 
made. This was due not only to the Commission's superior procedure in the 
first instance but also to its care in avoiding appeals; that is, to its self-restraint 
as well as to its efficiency. As a result, no great weight of precedent was 
built up to support the Campden decision; the judicial widening of the 
89 The Treasury Minute of 25 November 1887 is in the Report of the Select 
Committee on the Charity Commission, Appendix A, Parliamentary Papers, 1894 (221), 
xi. See also Questions 3347, 3351, 3356, 3915 and 3926. . . 
90 Report of the Select Committee on the Charity Commission, para. 7, 
Parliamentary Papers, 1894 (221), xi. 
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cy-pres doctrine therefore remained tentative and was reversed by the Weir 
Hospital Case in 1910. The will of the judges submitted itself once more 
to the will of the founder. Except for Westbury and Jessel, they had always 
responded more to the scientific dislike of doles than to the case for a 
reform of charity law in general. A judicial redefinition of charitable trusts 
would probably have been too great a change to be reversed in this way, 
but the smaller change needed statutory authority to survive in the otherwise 
unreformed body of charity law. As it turned out, the widening tendency 
passed with the waning of the charity reform movement. The Commission 
itself declined with the movement that had given it impetus. Further, 
charity reform acquired new connections that did the Commission no good. 
Failing to adjust itself to the rising tide of collectivism, charity reform became 
as repulsive as the poor law. Attaching itself to municipal reform, it ceased 
to support a central agency. And it took these new departures without ever 
having disarmed its original opposition. The laissez-faire strain in it managed 
to become antediluvian without becoming embedded in the conservative 
ethos. After the Campden decision the Charity Commission was satisfied 
less because it had got what it wanted - which was true enough - than 
because it was lucky to keep what it already had. Its satisfaction was the 
mark of resignation rather than of success. The Charity Commission, in a 
word, had come to terms with an uncharitable world. 
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